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“The water crisis is largely a crisis of governance” 
 
UNESCO, 2006: 1. 
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 An earlier version of this text was published in Brazil as “Water governance in the twentieth-first 
century”, in Ambiente e Sociedade, Vol. 10, no 2, pp. 97-118, University of Campinas, Brazil. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The challenges facing water management have become increasingly global in scope since the 
1970s. This reflects the rising awareness about the uncertainties posed by the worsening situa-
tion of the hydrosphere, and particularly freshwater, and the unsustainability of water manage-
ment practices in many areas. It is also a reflection of the conflicts flaring up from the protracted 
social inequalities affecting the access to water for essential human uses and from the ineffi-
ciency, ineffectiveness, and inefficacy characterizing water management in many regions, not 
just in the poorer countries. In this regard, since the 1970s the international community has 
launched significant and far-reaching policy initiatives in response to the challenges. These in-
clude tackling desertification, controlling water pollution, developing conflict prevention meas-
ures in the light of ongoing and potential water conflicts, monitoring and preventing water-
related threats and hazards (ranging from the impact of floods and other disastrous climatic 
events to the persistence, revival and emergence of water-related diseases), to overcoming the 
deficiencies and inequalities in the allocation and distribution of water for essential human use 
in developing countries (for a synthesis of the main international initiatives since the 1970s, see 
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“Milestones 1972 - 2003: from Stockholm to Kyoto” at UNESCO’s Water Portal, 
http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/milestones/index.shtml). 
However, despite the important efforts made in recent decades, there is a growing awareness 
that the struggle for reducing ecological unsustainability and limiting the negative impact of wa-
ter-related hazards and defficiencies in water management is being lost in many countries. As an 
example, let us consider the goal of guaranteeing universal access to essential water and sanita-
tion services, which continues to be a main target of the international community. The goal of 
universalizing these services was restated in the late 1970s, when the aspiration to provide es-
sential volumes of safe water to every human being on earth by 1990 was endorsed by the Unit-
ed Nations. The 1977 UN Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina, which led to the Inter-
national Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1980-1990), declared that everyone has 
“the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic 
needs”. The Decade was officially closed by the Global Consultation held in New Delhi in 
1990, which produced the New Delhi Statement calling for “some [water] for all rather than 
more for some” (UN, 1980; 1990). Unfortunately, and although significant progress has been 
made in some areas, that goal was not achieved. As a matter of fact, current estimates show that 
at the beginning of the twentieth first century 1.1 billion people, around 17 per cent of the world 
population, still lacks access to safe water while around 2.4 billion, or 40 per cent, has no access 
to adequate sanitation (EC, 2002a,b). Moreover, while the objectives for 1990 had been to guar-
antee universal access to essential volumes of water, the current targets as expressed in the UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000-2002 are limited to halving the pro-
portion of the world population without access to these services by 2015 (UN, 2000, 2002). Al-
though from a certain perspective the new goals may be more “realistic”, in practice this means 
that the international community is prepared to accept that a large proportion of human beings 
will continue to suffer disease and death owing to the lack of essential water services perhaps 
for decades to come. In this connection, a recent evaluation of the progress made in relation to 
the MDGs shows that even these limited objectives will not be achieved in many of the poorest 
countries, which are characterized by “fragile states […] with weak governance and institu-
tions” (WHO, 2005: 27, 71). 
There is increasing recognition that, to a large extent, the main causes for this unacceptable 
state of affairs are neither technical nor “natural” but rather are, broadly speaking, of a social 
and political nature. The water crisis, we are told, is mainly “a crisis of governance” (UNESCO, 
2006: 1). But, what does “governance” mean in this context? Although the prevailing uses of 
this concept in the literature dedicated to water seem to suggest a shared understanding of the 
meaning of governance, in fact the answer to this question is not straightforward. For some, go-
vernance is an instrument, a means to achieve certain ends, an administrative and technical tool-
kit that can be used in different contexts to reach a given objective, such as enforcing a particu-
lar water policy. For others, governance is a process involving not the instrumentalization of 
decisions taken by experts and powerholders, but rather the debate of alternative, often rival 
projects of societal development, and the definition of the ends and means that must be pursued 
by society, through a process of substantive democratic participation. In addition to the contrast-
ing conceptions of governance discussed here, there are also different intellectual and political 
traditions, some of them defending irreconcilable positions, which inform dissimilar understand-
ings and practices of governance. Thus, for instance, while certain traditions understand that wa-
ter governance must be structured around the principles that water is a common good and that 
essential water services are a public good that cannot be governed through the market, other tra-
ditions defend the entirely opposed view that water must be considered as an economic re-
source, essential water services as a private good, and that in consequence the governance of 
water and water services must be centred on market principles. These are just a few examples to 
demonstrate that the question about what exactly “governance” means requires careful consid-
eration. We come back to this later. 
The need to achieve a shared understanding of the “water crisis” has also important implica-
tions for water-related academic and techno-scientific endeavors, emphasizing the call for mea-
ningful, not just rhetorical, interdisciplinarity in water research. In this regard, although a high 
degree of sophistication has been reached in the techno-scientific fields related to water, such as 
hydrogeology, hydraulic engineering, or biotechnology applied to water management, we are 
still very far from plainly understanding the historical, socio-economic, cultural and political 
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processes underpinning the “water crisis”. This gap between the techno-scientific and socio-
political fields of knowledge, we claim, may contribute to explain why the enormous technolo-
gical progress made in relation to water in recent decades has not been reflected in more sus-
tainable, efficient, effective and efficacious practices of water management. Therefore, there is a 
need for establishing a balance between the techno-scientific, socio-economic, political, and cul-
tural aspects of water management activities, and superseding the artificial separation of water 
research and practice in disciplinary and corporatist feuds. Correspondingly, the development of 
genuinely interdisciplinary approaches that contribute towards developing water governance 
and management practices grounded on the principles of sustainability and social justice is one 
of the most urgent challenges facing water governance in the twentieth-first century. 
 
 
2  THE “WATER CRISIS” 
Writing “water crisis” with inverted commas denotes that the very notion that there is a water 
crisis is a contested matter. The intensity of the debate, and its propensity to become marred in 
circular arguments, are well reflected in the following statement from the First UN World Water 
Report: “the water crisis that exists is set to worsen despite continuing debate over the very exis-
tence of such a crisis” (UNESCO, 2003: 5). To make things worse, the camp of those who ac-
cept the existence of a global water crisis is divided, often irreconcilably, when it comes to de-
fining the dimensions, meanings, and extent of such crisis or, more importantly, to proposing 
the actions that are needed for overcoming the crisis or at least for mitigating its negative im-
pacts. For instance, let us briefly explore the most recent edition of UNESCO’s World Water 
Report, which follows on the steps of the 2003 report in defending the argument that a global 
water crisis exists (UNESCO, 2006). 
The first thing that must be said is that the report presents overwhelming evidence of the exis-
tence of a global water crisis, and it is an excellent effort to reflect the multidimensional charac-
ter of such crisis. It reminds us that from the total water volume on earth only 2.5 per cent is 
freshwater, and that only a fraction of this freshwater “in storage” is usable for human consump-
tion. This freshwater is unevenly distributed in geographical terms, and is subject to severe and 
adverse pressures from naturally occurring and human-driven processes. The report also identi-
fies the main human drivers of these impacts: “population growth, particularly in water-short 
regions, major demographic changes as people move from rural to urban environments, higher 
demands for food security and socio-economic well-being, in-creased competition between us-
ers and usages, pollution from industrial, municipal and agricultural sources” (Id. pp. 121-136). 
It also engages with arguably all the major themes characterizing the water crisis, including the 
problem of essential water and sanitation services, the water-related risks and threats to human 
health, the links between water management and poverty, water for industry, agriculture and 
energy, water for environmental sustainability, and the growing number of environmental refu-
gees displaced by climatic and human-driven processes (Id., 9, 316). Moreover, and of greater 
relevance for this article, “governance is an overarching theme” of the report and it certainly 
provides powerful insights into some of the crucial challenges affecting water governance 
worldwide (Id., p. 45). However, the report is also an excellent example of the protracted diffi-
culties facing water experts, specialists, and practitioners to overcome such obstacles to scientif-
ic knowledge as artificial disciplinary boundaries, and continued lack of conceptual frameworks 
to develop truly interdisciplinary coordinations, especially between the techno-sciences and the 
social sciences. Let us consider some examples. 
Firstly, in relation to the permanence of artificial boundaries, the continued use of concepts 
such as “water sector” or “water resources” throughout the report, suggests that the dimensions 
and concepts of traditional disciplines have disproportionate prevalence over other approaches. 
A similar report where, for instance, ecological economists or political ecologists play a more 
central role would certainly frame the analysis with a different conceptual apparatus that incor-
porates the interconnectedness that exists between water management and other human endea-
vors, which is lost in the traditional treatment of activities as “sectors”. 
Secondly, the report tends to define water almost invariably as a “resource”, including a 
chapter on “The state of the resource” (Id., p. 119). The document also pays attention to the eco-
systemic character of water issues, but the prevalence in the report of a language that reduces 
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water to one of its many dimensions, that of being a resource for humans, illustrates the persis-
tence of disciplinary enclosures preventing cross-fertilization in the production of scientific 
knowledge about water. The repeated conceptualization of water as a resource, used more than 
1400 times in the document, would be strongly criticized by ecologists and ecological econo-
mists, among others, as being tributary to a resource-oriented model of water management that 
is actually responsible to a large extent for the current “water crisis”. There is a growing body of 
literature dealing with these problems, including a number of studies focusing on “water securi-
ty” that highlight the implications and contradictions inherent in treating water as a “natural re-
source”, as a “commodity”, as an “entitlement”, and so on (Webb and Iskandarani, 1998; see al-
so EUWATER, 2005). 
Thirdly, the treatment of water values, to which the report dedicates a whole chapter, reflects 
the existing contradictions and confrontations between irreconcilable positions on this subject. It 
also adopts one of the main competing arguments without paying sufficient attention to alterna-
tive positions in the highly contested debate about valuation. Let us examine first the contradic-
tions. The report states that 
 
“As a physical, emotional and cultural life-giving element, water must be considered as more 
than just an economic resource. Sharing water is an ethical imperative as well as an expression 
of human identity and solidarity […]. Valuing water, including sustaining and fostering water-
related cultural diversity, heritage and knowledge, is critical to enhancing our ability to adapt in 
a changing world. Economic valuation of water resources must be recognized as existing within 
this larger and more complex context of valuing water” (Id., p. 403, 405).  
 
This is a well-thought statement which raises the reader’s expectations about the propositions 
that the report may have to offer in terms of developing systems for capturing this multidimen-
sional and complex universe of water values. However, what comes next is a conventional les-
son on economic valuation of water resources and services that fails to live up to the rhetorical 
recognition that economic valuation is just one among other dimensions of the problem. More-
over, the approach to economic valuation that is given central stage in the document is just one 
among a number of different rival positions competing in the field, but this is not adequately 
explained. For instance, the report classifies “residential water supply” and “residential sanita-
tion” under “Consumer Goods” within the category “Commodity (or Private) Goods” and not 
under “Public Goods”, a category reserved in this document for the protection of the “aquatic 
environment”, “wild lands”, and “biodiversity and endangered species” (Id. p. 409). Thus, an 
ongoing debate taking place globally about the need to consider essential water services such as 
water and sanitation as public goods, a social right, and a universal human right, and not a pri-
vate good or commodity is entirely neglected (see, among others, Ward, 1997; Petrella, 2001; 
Strang, 2004; EUWATER, 2005). Intentionally or not, the report has abandoned here the scien-
tific approach to support one of the rival positions in the debate, without adequate justification. 
Once this positioning of the authors has been identified, other apparent contradictions in this 
crucial section of the document become more intelligible. For instance, it states next that  
 
“Governance strategies should be selected to optimize the achievement of societal goals. In 
this context, valuation can be viewed as a fairly neutral and objective process by which social 
goals and trade-offs can be identified and debated and the optimal governance strategies cho-
sen” (Id. p. 410). 
 
Although in some passages of the document there is a clear recognition that governance can-
not be reduced to a policy instrument (Id., pp. 46-49), the key section of the report “Responding 
to the challenge of valuing water” is grounded on this instrumental understanding of governance 
as a strategy to achieve certain goals. A number of questions arise from this statement. How are 
these “societal goals” defined? Who defines these goals? Why a particular language of valua-
tion, economic valuation, has been preferred over others? Who has the power to decide that this 
is the relevant language of valuation for water management issues (on value diversity and lan-
guages of valuation, see Martínez Alier, 2002). What principles inform this “governance strate-
gy” based on economic valuation? The instrumental understanding of governance adopted in 
this crucial section of the document is, unfortunately, prevalent in the specialized water litera-
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ture, which has tended to depoliticise water management processes by treating them as mainly 
(or even merely) “technical”, “objective and neutral” (we come back to this later). 
We have taken advantage of some gaps and internal contradictions in what is otherwise a 
state of the art review of the situation affecting the hydrosphere. Our main reason for discussing 
the above examples is to cast light on some of the crucial challenges affecting the governance of 
water in the twentieth-first century. We believe that the increasing rhetorical recognition of the 
need for a more complex analysis of the water crisis, as exemplified by the 2006 UNESCO 
World Water Report commented above, can stimulate genuine attempts to develop a more com-
prehensive, interdisciplinary understanding of water governance. 
In this regard, one of the common themes that can be identified in the diverse international in-
itiatives directed at tackling the water crisis is the widespread recognition of the centrality of 
“good”, “effective” or “sound” governance (i.e. ADB, 1995; EC, 2000, 2002b; GWP, 2003; 
Camdessus, 2003; Cosgrove, 2003; UNDP, 2004; UNESCO, 2006). However, as already men-
tioned, despite the apparent agreement on the crucial importance of “governance”, the debate is 
marred by conceptual ambiguity and is subject to the tensions inherent in the very nature of the 
process of democratic governance. Let us briefly review some aspects of this debate relevant to 
our discussion.  
 
 
 
3 GOVERNANCE 
The debate on governance is subject to underlying confrontations between rival and at times 
even incompatible intellectual and political traditions, which defend often irreconcilable oppos-
ing principles and values. Although this is often blurred by the assertive use of the concept in 
mainstream public policy documents, the fact is that different actors have diverse, often contra-
dictory, understandings of governance. This, consequently, informs very different, frequently 
incompatible, policy strategies and decisions, given that governance or, to be more precise, 
democratic governance is a political process characterized by the confrontation of rival political 
projects grounded on different values and principles. The case of water governance lends itself 
as an excellent ground to illustrate these nuances. Rather than being just a matter of pure aca-
demic disquisition, the contradictions between competing intellectual and political frameworks 
underscore much of the institutional and political transformations undergone in the field of wa-
ter policy and management.  
In this connection, from a general perspective, the concept of governance aims at conceptua-
lizing evolving forms of government and regulation that trascend those based on traditional state 
hierarchies and market systems (Hirst, 1994; Held, 1995; Amin, 1997). In the field of develop-
ment policy, for instance, the concept of governance has become central to the argument that the 
traditional forms of management based on “state monopoly” over decisions and institutional ar-
rangements are been replaced by new forms characterized for “pragmatic pluralism” (Esman, 
1991; see also UNESCO, 2006: 48). Thus, “governance” would be a process resulting from the 
articulation of the classic forms of authority embodied in the state (hierarchical organization) 
with those characteristic of the private sector (driven by market competition) and the voluntary 
sector or “civil society” (characterized by citizens’ voluntary action, reciprocity, and solidarity) 
(e.g. UNDP, 1997, 1998; Picciotto, 1997; see also Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). For instance, in 
reference to the situation in the European Union, governance has been described as a multi-
layered, multi-scale, and multi-sector ensemble characterised by a combination of hierarchical 
structures, participatory dynamics, associative action, and market mechanisms, and would be 
based mainly on a culture of dialogue, negotiation, active citizenship, subsidiarity, and institu-
tional strengthening (Heinault et. al., 2002).  
Far from being an abstract academic discussion, this debate has far-reaching consequences 
for public policy in general, including water policy. As already mentioned, despite rhetorical 
recognition to the contrary, in the water policy literature governance is often understood instru-
mentally, as a mean to achieve certain objectives, as a policy strategy, rather than as a complex 
process of democratic dialogue, negotiation, and citizen participation that includes the discus-
sion about what objectives must be pursued by society. Also, and closely related to the previous 
point, the conceptualization of governance that tends to prevail in this literature often presents 
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an idealized vision of the interrelations between the main spheres involved: the state, the mar-
ket, and “civil society”. This idealized version of governance presents the state, the market and 
“civil society” as partners participating in symmetric, triangular interaction, as in the notions of 
“public-private partnership” and “tri-partite partnership”, which have become central in main-
stream public policy (e.g. Picciotto, 1997; UNDP, 2006; World Bank, 2006). We argue that 
there is a need to critically examine these instrumental and idealized understandings of gover-
nance that can be identified in the policy literature. 
For instance, key concepts comprised in the notion of governance, such as “civil society”, 
have different, even opposing, meanings for different intellectual and political traditions (see, 
for instance, Cohen and Arato, 1994; Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001). Thus, for the free-market lib-
eral tradition “civil society” is coterminous with the market: a sphere of action characterized by 
the free concurrence of self-interested, egoistic individuals pursuing their own ends. For free-
market liberalism, a tradition that has arguably exercised a major influence in global public pol-
icy, and certainly in water policy, since the 1980s, there is no triangular interaction because 
there are in fact only two partners in the picture: the state and the market. Moreover, for this in-
tellectual tradition the only role of the state should be to guarantee the free operation of market 
forces, minimizing or, preferably, cancelling state control and regulation over private actors 
(e.g. Brooke Cowen and Cowen, 1998; Newbery, 1999). Let us emphasise here that although 
this minimalist understanding of governance in the free-market liberal tradition is not widely 
shared in the water-policy community, it has nevertheless exercised significant influence in 
shaping public policy, including water policy, worlwide since the 1980s. As stated by Joseph 
Stiglitz, former Chief Economist at the World Bank and 2001 Economics Nobel Prize, in his 
evaluation of the influence of free-market liberalism in global public policy: 
 
In setting the rules of the game, commercial and financial interests and mind-sets have see-
mingly prevailed within the international economic institutions. A particular view of the role of 
government and markets has come to prevail –a view which is not universally accepted within 
the developed countries, but which is being forced upon the developing countries and the econ-
omies in transition (Stiglitz, 2002: 224-5; see also Leys, 2001).  
 
As Stiglitz’s statement suggests, the free-market notion of governance, that is, “the particular 
view of the role of governments and markets” held by this tradition, is not widely accepted. It 
certainly differs in substantial ways with the understanding of governance held by rival intellec-
tual and political traditions. For instance, contrary to the identification of “civil society” with the 
market held by free-market liberals, the pluralist and communitarian traditions tend to under-
stand “civil society” as the realm of voluntary action, reciprocity, and solidarity, a buffer space 
between the market and the state. This understanding of civil society as a separate sphere of ac-
tion vis a vis the state and the market has played a crucial role in the worldwide social and polit-
ical struggles against dictatorships and authoritarian regimes since the 1960s, and gained mo-
mentum since the 1980s with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of military 
dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere. From another angle, this notion of civil society 
reflects the expanding role of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), social movements, and 
other actors that have become increasingly influential in public policy, and certainly in water 
policy. On the one hand, this understanding of civil society contributes to a more complex con-
cept of governance that captures the multi-actor, multi-dimensional, multi-sector character of 
public policy decisions and actions. On the other hand, however, as already discussed much of 
the water policy literature tends to adopt an idealized notion of civil society as the realm of reci-
procity, voluntary action and solidarity, and this notion informs and idealized understanding of 
governance as a balanced partnership between the state, the market and “civil society”. This 
idealized notion, in turn, provides the rhetorical framework for the adoption of an instrumental 
understanding of governance, as a neutral and objective tool or strategy for policy implementa-
tion, which is devoid of any political content. Thus, in an apparent paradox, governance, which 
is esentially a political process, becomes depoliticised in the water policy literature. We come 
back to this in a moment, but let us briefly discuss first another aspect of the complex nuances 
characterizing the understanding of governance: the diverse notions and practices of governance 
in different political cultures.  
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The diversity in the understandings of governance across different political cultures can be il-
lustrated, for the sake of brevity, by reference to the rival notions and practices characterizing 
the notion of “citizenship” (see, for instance, Delanty, 2000; van Steenbergen, 1994). “Active 
citizenship” is one of the main drivers of action within “civil society” according to the under-
standing of governance prevailing in the water policy literature. However, what are the notions 
and practices of “citizenship” and “citizen participation” underlying these discourses? Again, 
we are confronted with rival, even irreconcilable notions of citizenship, although this fact is ob-
scured in the policy literature which tends to assume a shared understanding of this concept. For 
instance, free-market liberalism has a particular understanding of citizenship that is limited to 
the realm of civil and political rights. In a nutshell, the free-market notion of citizenship is cen-
tred on the protection of individual rights, particularly the right to own property, to formal judi-
cial procedures, and to exercise the political right of electing or being elected for government. 
The essence of this tradition is the protection of individual freedom against state intrusion, 
which includes freedom from state controls and excessive regulation in the pursuit of market in-
terests. Contrastingly, to give another example relevant for water policy, for the social-
democratic tradition, in its different national varieties, the individual rights of citizenship are 
complemented by “social rights”, such as the right to have universal access to essential public 
services like as education and public health, which includes the access to affordable and safe 
water and sanitation services. Social rights of citizenship in this tradition are deemed to ensure 
the abatement of market-based social inequalities to provide all citizens with a status that is in-
dependent of their market position and thus enabling the less favoured members of society to 
excersise their citizenship rights more fully. This notion of social rights is rejected in the free-
market liberal tradition, which considers social rights as an obstacle and not as vehicle for indi-
vidual freedom and citizenship. Moreover, these tensions at the heart of one of the most che-
rished notions in modern western political theory, citizenship, adopt a diversity of configura-
tions in the different countries and political cultures of the western hemisphere. As before, this 
is not merely an academic disquisition that lacks relevance for the earthly concerns of those in-
volved in practical policy and managament activities. The influence of the rival positionings 
about citizenship informing different political cultures can be clearly identified in the current 
water policy documents, debates, and practices. 
These considerations are even more relevant when we address the situation of non-western 
and, particularly, developing countries, given that notions such as “governance”, “civil society” 
or “citizenship” emerged from the specific historical experience of Western Europe and the US 
and their empirical reference may be completely absent in other societies. For instance, let us 
focus for a moment on the notion of governance as a “partnership”, which as discussed earlier 
pressuposses a balanced, symmetrical association between “the state”, the “market”, and “civil 
society”. In practice, this notion has no empirical correlate in many countries, which are charac-
terized by a frail public sector with low or null capacity for regulation and law enforcement, and 
where “civil society” is often limited to a small local elite, given that the bulk of society cannot 
afford to participate meaningfully in the social and political life or take part in the decision-
making process. Unfortunately, this is the situation in a large number of countries that are 
among the worst affected by the “water crisis” and where the need for “good water governance” 
is consequently more urgent. A recent report forecasts that many of these countries will not be 
able to achieve the MDGs precisely because of the fragility of the public sector and the resulting 
poor “governance” (WHO, 2005: 27, 71). Thus, in many developing countries the notion of go-
vernance as a “partnership” is meaningless, as citizens have no capacity to exercise democratic 
control over public or private actors in charge of water management and is often defenceless in 
the face of water-related risks and hazards. However, this situation is by no means limited to 
developing countries, given that citizen participation in the process of environmental gover-
nance tends to be very limited in developed countries too (Dryzek, 1997; see also Beck, 1992, 
1998). 
Although many of these caveats about the meaning of “governance” are well-known and 
form part of the wide-ranging debates taking place around the world on this subject (e.g. GWP, 
2003), in practice the prevailing understanding of governance as an instrument or as an idea-
lized system of shared responsibility continues to permeate public policy decisions and practic-
es, including those involving water management. In our perspective, one of the most crucial 
problems is that the mainstream water policy literature tends to present a depoliticized under-
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standing of governance, although it is essentially a political process. The main mechanism of 
this depoliticisation of “governance” is the exclusion of ends and values from the debate, thus 
reducing it to a merely instrumental, technical, supposedly neutral management process or poli-
cy strategy. For instance, let us consider the suggestion for water reform offered in a recent 
study commissioned by the World Bank. The authors argued that: 
 
The major thrust of institutional reforms within the water sector is to enhance the functional 
capabilities, operational strength, and institutional readiness to handle water challenges both at 
present and in the future. Given this thrust, the main objectives of institutional initiatives are ra-
ther transparent. These objectives are to: make water as an economic good, strengthen allocation 
capabilities, increase the reliance on market forces, revive the payment culture, ensure financial 
self-sufficiency, promote decentralized decision structure, and encourage the adoption of mod-
em technology and information inputs (Saleth and Dinar, 1999: 36). 
 
In this statement we are presented with a number of objectives for institutional reform. Leav-
ing aside the discussion about the suitability of these objectives, the main questions in relation 
to water governance would be: who are the actors that decide that these are the main objectives 
for reforming water institutions? What is the process through which this decision is taken? What 
is the role of the citizens in this process? Are they consulted? What mechanisms are available 
for them to participate in this process? Moreover, what are the ultimate ends and values inform-
ing the adoption of such objectives? And what understanding of water governance underlies the 
study’s approach to the reform of water institutions? The reference to this study is just an exam-
ple of the contradictions inherent in the prevailing technocratic approaches to water manage-
ment. In this case, a highly political process such as that required for reforming water institu-
tions tends to be depoliticized in the analysis and presented as a neutral, “transparent”, policy 
instrument. 
However, there exist alternative understandings of governance that provide elements for 
thinking beyond instrumental action, as the following example illustrate: 
 
The core of governance has to do with determining what ends and values should be chosen 
and the means by which those ends and values should be pursued, i.e. the direction of the social 
unit, e.g. society, community or organization. Governance includes activities such as efforts to 
influence the social construction of shared beliefs about reality; the creation of identities and in-
stitutions; the allocation and regulation of rights and obligations among interested parties; and 
the distribution of economic means and welfare services. Governance, in other words, is the 
shaping and sustaining of the arrangements of authority and power within which actors make 
decisions and frame policies that are binding on individual and collective actors within different 
territorial bounds (Hanf and Jansen, 1998: 3). 
 
In this perspective, governance cannot be reduced to an instrument for the implementation of 
policy decisions taken, presumably, by experts in the relevant fields (see, for instance, Dryzek, 
1997). Governance is not a strategy, and is not an idealized scheme of interaction between also 
idealized actors. Governance, always in this perspective, is a political process involving the ex-
ercise of political power by political actors who seek to define the ends and values that must in-
form social development. It also comprises the identification of means to pursue those ends and 
values, and the adoption of suitable arrangements for the exercise of authority and power in the 
process. This understanding of governance inmediately elicits a number of questions, in the 
light of the previous discussion. What are the ends and values that inform water policy and 
management? Who participates in the determination of these ends and values? Who determines 
the means by which those ends and values should be pursued? How are these decisions taken? 
How do (do they) common citizens participate in the determination of those ends and values, 
and in the identification of the means for pursuing them? 
In this connection, the determination of the ends and values in relation to water management, 
and the selection of the means to pursue those ends and values, does not happen in a social va-
cuum. Rather than being the result of a balanced partnership, the process of water governance 
resembles a highly asymmetric and evolving structure where the actors tend to have dissimilar 
proportions of political power and knowledge. In practice, water policies that have often a sig-
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nificant political content are designed and implemented with disregard for the values, opinions, 
and preferences of the citizens and in the absence of democratic governance arrangements. In 
practice, water governance consists in the interaction between governments, large businesses, 
political parties, civil and other organizations representing sectoral interests (e.g. workers’ un-
ions, religious organizations, peasant movements, etc.), international agencies (e.g. international 
financial institutions and other agents of the process of “global governance”), NGOs, and other 
relevant powerholders. These actors are involved in continuing debates and in social and politi-
cal confrontations around how water and essential water services should be governed, by whom, 
and for whom. These confrontations are at the heart of the process of democratic water gover-
nance, which is characterized not only by dialogue and negotiation but also, unfortunately, by 
growing uncertainty and protracted social and political conflicts. To this we turn next. 
 
3.1 Water uncertainty and conflict 
One particular area that requires urgent efforts towards enhancing inter-disciplinary coordina-
tion between the techno- and the social sciences concerns the study of the uncertainties and con-
flicts emerging around the management of water and water services. Regarding water uncertain-
ty, debates on risk and “manufactured uncertainty” have emphasised environmental threats and 
hazards among which water-related extreme events and human defficiencies in the management 
of water have a central place (e.g., Beck, 1992; McGranahan et. al., 2001). International concern 
on these issues has led to a wide variety of efforts aimed at assessing the dimension and scale of 
these risks in the search for adequate approaches to limit their negative impacts (Kasperson et. 
al, 1995; Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001; UNEP-UNICEF-WHO, 2002; WHO, 2003a,b; 
WHO-Europe, 2003; UN-Habitat, 2003; UNESCO, 2003, 2006; UNICEF, 2005). Similarly, ex-
isting and potential conflicts over water at the international level have elicited an ongoing aca-
demic and political debate and a number of important initiatives oriented at preventing conflict 
and promoting water sharing and cooperation (e.g. Cosgrove, 2003). We will come back to wa-
ter conflicts but let us first consider briefly the notion of water uncertainty and risk. 
Arguably, the ultimate water uncertainty concerns the very survival of the hydrosphere, and 
particularly its freshwater component. Pressures on available freshwater are driven by contradic-
tory forces such as the rising water volumes extracted for human uses and the need to slow 
down and reduce water abstractions to restore and protect the fragile equilibrium of ecosystems 
and water bodies. In particular, water needed for agriculture, which currently accounts for about 
70 per cent of the world’s freshwater consumption (estimates indicate that in some developing 
countries, but also in certain developed countries, irrigation uses up to 85 per cent of freshwater 
abstracted), poses a crucial challenge (Bruinsma, 2003: 138; World Bank, 2004: 5, 14). For in-
stance, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization forecasts that developing countries will need 
an average increase of 14 percent in irrigation water withdrawals until the year 2030, which ac-
cording to FAO will not have a significant impact on the agreggate available freshwater 
(Bruinsma, 2003: 140-142; the document admits that individual countries are already in a criti-
cal situation). However, environmentalists claim that to stop the generalized overpumping of 
aquifers, falling water tables, and rapid deterioration of aquatic ecosystems water abstractions 
should be significantly reduced to restore sustainable water levels (Brown, 2005: Chapter 6). 
The critics point at dramatic examples such as the Dead Sea (Friends of the Earth, 2006) and the 
Aral Sea in Central Asia (Altyev, 2006), which have shrunk to a fraction of their original sizes 
as a result of extensive irrigation and water-consuming industrial activities, and these are just 
two examples in a long list of dying rivers, lakes, aquifers, wetlands and water bodies (Brown, 
op. cit.). In this context, it is difficult to foresee how we could possibly achieve simultaneously 
food security and sustainable water management. Similar dilemmas are faced in other areas of 
water management owing to competing demands on freshwater sources coming from rising liv-
ing standards in urban areas of developing countries and from the expansion of cash crops and 
tourism in water-scarce regions, or from the worldwide destruction of mangroves through the 
expansion of shrimp farming, to mention just a few areas of concern. Other authors have also 
examined how social cleavages grounded on poverty, gender, and ethnicity, among other fac-
tors, impinge on the water insecurity affecting large sectors of the world’s population (Webb 
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and Iskandarani, 1998). These and other water uncertainties, in turn, are intimately related to ex-
isting or potential conflicts over water, which we examine next.  
 
3.1.1 Water conflicts 
The prospect that social and political conflicts over the distribution and allocation of water will 
increasingly “become a key part of the 21st-century landscape” is regularly restated by interna-
tional leaders (e.g. van Ginkel, 2001). For instance, in February 2006 the British government is-
sued a dramatic warning about the increased likelihood of “wars over water” and announced 
that its military forces must be prepared to intervene in “humanitarian disaster relief, peacekeep-
ing and warfare” related to dwindling natural resources, particularly water (The Independent, 
2006).  This is not entirely surprising given that over the last few decades international security 
experts have warned that water was becoming more important than oil as a potential source of 
conflicts around the world (Gleick, 1993, 2000). Some authors have pointed out that the fact 
that global freshwater sources are unevenly and irregularly distributed, that some regions of the 
world are extremely water-short, and that water bodies are often shared by two or more coun-
tries is a looming source of conflicts, and the situation would be set to worsen as we progress in-
to the twentieth-first century. These warnings seem to have good ground when we consider that 
263 river basins, where about half of the world population is located, are shared by two or more 
countries (Cosgrove, 2003: 1). It is also estimated that fewer than 10 countries control about 60 
percent of the world’s freshwater sources, and a large number of groundwater aquifers are 
shared by two or more countries (Ohlsson, 1992; Samson and Charrier, 1997). Nevertheless, 
this notion that international water wars are inminent is fiercely contested by authors who argue 
that there is scarce historical evidence in favour of the hypothesis that transboundary waters 
tend to be the cause of war between countries and that rather peaceful cooperation in water shar-
ing would have been the main international pattern for millennia (Allan, 2001; Cosgrove, 2003: 
10-11; Yoffe et. al., 2004). 
This highly relevant debate on the potential for international water conflict and cooperation is 
far from being settled. However, there is a second dimension of water conflicts that continues to 
receive relatively less attention in the mainstream water policy literature: intra-national water 
conflicts. This characterization may be misleading, as in fact in many cases water conflicts have 
both an inter- and an intra-national dimension. Nevertheless, the focus here is particularly on 
social struggles over water that range from confrontations over the control of water bodies and 
water infrastructure to urban conflicts over the inequalities and inefficiencies in the access to es-
sential water services. On this subject, there is solid historical evidence showing that the control 
of water and water systems has played a significant role in the emergence of social and political 
conflicts, and continue to do so. Thus, water control has been a major factor in the establishment 
and consolidation of asymmetrical power relations often leading to structural conditions of in-
equality and injustice in the access to water, not just in the classical “hydraulic civilizations” 
studied by Karl Witffogel (Wittfogel, 1956, 1959) but also in recent centuries and to the present 
time. Among other cases it can be mentioned Bolivia (Crespo Flores et. al., 2003), India (Shiva, 
1992), Italy (Santino, 1994, 2003), Mexico (Musset, 1991; Bennett, 1995; Perló Cohen and 
González Reynoso, 2005; Castro, 2006), Spain (Arrojo Agudo and Martínez Gil, 1999; BCFS, 
2004), and the United States (Meyer, 1984; Worster, 1985; Hundley, 1992; Berry, 1998), just to 
mention some examples. 
In more recent years, the record of intra-national water conflicts include from peaceful de-
mands to the authorities, judicial litigation, demonstrations, mass parades, and other forms of 
civic protest including civil disobedience such as non payment of taxes or water bills, to direct 
confrontations involving in the extreme the destruction of property (e.g. destruction of water in-
frastructure) and often the loss of human lives. Although these forms of water conflict have be-
come widespread around the world (see, for instance, Shiva, 2002; Bouguerra, 2003; Barraqué 
and Vlachos, 2006), they tend to receive less attention in the mainstream water policy literature. 
However, this is arguably one of the most difficult challenges facing water governance in the 
twentieth-first century: while it may be possible that the predictions about future international 
water wars are exaggerated, the occurrence of intra-national social struggles fuelled by water in-
equality and injustice is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future. 
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3.2 Water conflict as an object of knowledge 
As suggested in the previous discussion, water conflicts are part and parcel of wider social and 
political confrontations between alternative, often antagonistic societal projects, confrontations 
that are at the heart of the process of governance. However, the aim of this chapter is not to ex-
plore the confrontations themselves but to contribute towards the development of interdiscipli-
nary coordinations in the production of scientific knowledge about water conflicts, which re-
quires the exploration of how physical-natural and social processes interweave. In this regard, 
the evidence shows that the emergence of water conflicts is seldom the sole result of “natural” 
causes such as freshwater scarcity in arid and semi-arid regions. Cooperation, solidarity and 
successful bottom-up “water governance” arrangements have been developed in very adverse 
conditions of natural water scarcity, as in the classical example of medieval Valencia in Spain 
(Glick, 1970), but also in places as pre-colonial Bali in Indonesia (Geertz, 1980), Ceylon 
(Leach, 1959), or the Philippines (Ostrom, 1990) to mention a few typical cases. Conversely, 
there are obvious examples of protracted social conflicts over water in the context of very fa-
vorable hydrological conditions such as for instance in Guayaquil, Ecuador (Swyngedouw, 
2004) or in the state of Chiapas in Mexico (Castro, 1992). 
Unfortunately, on the one hand, the production of scientific knowledge about water conflicts, 
and in general about water, is characterized by high fragmentation along the lines of entrenched 
epistemic cultures that continue to develop largely unconnected from each other. On the other 
hand, however, the existing fragmentation in the knowledge about water conflicts offers an ex-
cellent opportunity to develop genuine interdisciplinary approaches that bring together the ex-
pertise developed in the techno- and the social sciences, and other epistemic fields. In this re-
gard, relevant suggestions for the study of water conflicts can be found in the interdisciplinary 
field of political ecology, which is concerned with the study of “ecological distribution con-
flicts” (Guha and Martínez Alier, 1997: 31). Political ecological perspectives have inspired an 
expanding body of water research (Swyngedouw et. al., 2002) on a number of problems ranging 
from the links between conflicts over the provision of urban water services and the process of 
global capital accumulation (Swyngedouw, 1999, 2004), the multidimensional character of wa-
ter struggles arising from neoliberal water reform policies (Laurie et. al., 2002; Laurie 2006), to 
the interrelations between intra-national water conflicts and the long-term development of citi-
zenship (Castro, 2006), just to give a few examples. 
However, the development of interdisciplinary strategies for the production of knowledge 
across the techno- and the social sciences continues to be difficult and progress is slow. Among 
other aspects that require further consideration is the fact that knowledge about water is pro-
duced from a number of distinctive, often unconnected epistemic perspectives, and the resulting 
fragmentation of knowledge tends to become structural owing to entrenched disciplinary and in-
stitutional power configurations, a problem which is not limited to the field of water research 
(e.g., Knorr Cetina, 1999). For instance, in our studies on contemporary social conflicts over 
water in Mexico we identified a number of distinct epistemic subjects involved in water man-
agement activities who understand and explain water conflicts from very different, often uncon-
nected perspectives (Castro, 1995; 2006). For the sake of the analysis we derived from the em-
pirical research the existence of three epistemic subjects: the water expert, mainly water 
engineers and others directly involved in the techno-scientific aspects of water management, the 
water functionary, who are members of the bureaucratic and policy-institutional apparatuses in 
charge of water management activities, and the critical social scientist, referring broadly to the 
work of social scientists producing knowledge about water from a critical perspective such as 
contemporary political ecology. The evidence suggests that these different subjects construct 
their knowledge about water conflicts on the basis of different rationalities and epistemic struc-
tures, which underpin the identification of very different observables for the identification and 
explanation of “water conflicts” (on the concept of observable see Piaget, 1978: 43-6; 1977:  
342-6.). Table 1, where we have added additional examples of epistemic subjects involved in 
water research, illustrates schematically the diverse approaches of these subjects to “water con-
flicts”. 
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Table 1. Water conflict and epistemic subjects 
 
Epistemic subject 
 
Rationality 
 
Observables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Water conflict” 
 
Water expert 
(Geo-hydrologists; hy-
draulic engineers, etc.) 
 
Techno-scientific 
 
Quantitative indicators 
 
Physical-natural and 
technical conditions and 
drivers 
 
Water resources 
 
 
Administrative-financial 
experts 
 
 
Market 
 
Quantitative indicators 
 
Economic efficiency 
Market criteria 
 
Water functionary 
 
Policy-administrative 
 
Bureaucratic norms 
 
Electoral and party-
political considerations 
 
 
Ecologist 
 
 
Ecological 
 
Indicators of sustaina-
bility-insustainabiity 
 
Ecosystems 
 
 
Critical social scientist 
 
 
Socio-political 
 
Power configurations 
 
Structural inequalities 
 
Social identities 
 
Languages of valuation 
 
 
 
For instance, in the early 1980s Mexican water experts elaborated a map of “conflicts over 
water in the main Mexican cities” to predict the ocurrence of such events between 1980 and the 
year 2000 (SARH, 1981: 50). A close examination showed that they grounded their analysis on 
quantitative observables, such as the interactions between water availability, demand, supply, 
consumption, cost and population, urban and industrial growth over the period under analysis. 
They conceptualized urban water conflicts from a techno-scientific perspective, and therefore 
conflict in their analysis would be the result of the lack of expected correspondence between 
quantitative variables, such as a geometrical increase of water demand in the arid areas of the 
country where water availability was already compromised in 1980. In contrast, for the “water 
functionary” the notion of water conflicts places the emphasis on a different array of obser-
vables, which can also be illustrated from our research on Mexico. Besides the techno-scientific 
rationality (after all many water functionaries are techno-scientists by training) they are subject 
to policy-bureaucratic, and often also party-political, interests such as concerns about the impact 
of water conflicts on electoral prospects. Therefore, their observables are for instance the recur-
rent events of urban social protest over the poor quality of the water services or the civil disobe-
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dience of water users who have decided not to pay their bills in protest for a recent hike in the 
tariff. In general, the water functionary must deal with processes that fall outside the technical 
domain of the expert, such as “popular discontent”, “the social and economic characteristics of 
the population” that create conditions for water troubles, or the inherent contradictions between 
“the economic, social, psychological and environmental values of water” (SARH, 1981: 14). In 
turn, the critical social scientist is concerned with the task of making observable the intertwining 
between the social regularities and physical-natural processes that are at the heart of water con-
flicts. For instance, and remaining with the Mexican example, the socio-political rationality of 
this subject provides a framework for inquiring into the socio-economic and political mechan-
isms that underpin the exclusion of a large fraction of the population from access to safe and af-
fordable water services, a major cause of water conflict in Mexico. 
A similar scheme of analysis could be applied for the treatment of water conflicts in other 
areas of activity, such as the widespread struggles against “water privatization” or the opposi-
tion to large scale hydraulic works like dams and inter-basin water transfers. However, the 
scheme in Table 1 is only a simplification to cast light on the distinctive rationalities operating 
in water research and policy, which may help to better understand some of the key obstacles for 
interdisciplinary coordination in the study of water conflicts. It is important to clarify that the 
epistemic subjects represent bodies of knowledge and traditions of thought, not individuals or 
collective actors, who in practice may embody one or more epistemic cultures. We believe that 
the identification of the conceptual frameworks, rationalities, and observables operating in the 
field of water research, as we have attempted to sketch here, is an esencial exercise to strengthen 
the foundations of meaningful interdisciplinary in this field. 
 
 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
There is increasing recognition that the “water crisis” is mainly a crisis of governance. Unfortu-
nately, although the use of the concept of “governance” often assumes a shared understanding, 
in fact there exist underlying confrontations between rival theoretical bodies of knowledge and 
political and cultural traditions for which governance has entirely different meanings. Moreover, 
much of the mainstream debate on the topic has been aimed at depoliticising the processes un-
der discussion and presenting them as mainly (or even merely) “technical” in nature, probably 
in the belief that depoliticising water management activities would provide opportunities for ab-
ating or at least controlling water uncertainty and conflict. An important aspect of this debate 
concerns the question of social participation in relation to problems of water uncertainty and 
risk, which is a central component of the process of democratic governance. How are the risks 
associated with water management communicated to the wider public? How do citizens partici-
pate in the process? What mechanisms are available for them to participate? How are the societ-
al goals informing water policy identified? What ends and values are prioritized in these goals? 
What means are chosen to pursue those ends and values? What languages of valuation are cho-
sen in the process? Who takes these decisions? Who are the actors that these decisions intend to 
benefit? What mechanisms of democratic control exist to monitor decision takers and imple-
mentors of water policy? These and other similar questions are at the heart of the process of 
democratic governance, and we know that this process is undergoing a severe crisis worldwide. 
Unsurprisingly, this crisis of water governance is being increasingly expressed in the form of in-
ter-, and particularly intra-national social and political conflicts over water, which present one 
of the most formidables challenges for the scientific community involved in water research and 
practice. 
Our conclusion draws on the perspective of one of the epistemic subjects sketched above, the 
critical social scientist, which stems from a long-standing tradition in the social sciences con-
cerned with developing the appropriate cognitive structures for making observable such struc-
tural regularities as cyclical social conflicts —whether in relation to water or not. However, the 
task of elaborating adequate explanations of the causes and consequences of water uncertainty 
and inequality requires the development of further interdisciplinary coordination between the in-
tellectual domains of, for instance, water engineers, hydrologists, and social scientists, which to 
date has been a slow and relatively fruitless endeavour. The existing gap between the intellec-
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tual domains developed by techno-scientists and critical social scientists concerned with social 
inequality and struggle remains a major obstacle to achieve this goal. The persistence of this ob-
stacle continues to hamper our full understanding of “water conflicts’’, and consequently dimi-
nishes the chances we may have to avoid their negative consequences, which almost systemati-
cally affect the most vulnerable sectors of the population. 
In this connection, there is a need for adopting a critical perspective of the understanding of 
water governance as an instrument, a supposedly neutral policy tool, which aims at depoliticis-
ing what is essentially a political process. The idealized and instrumental approaches to water 
governance tend to neglect in their analysis, despite rhetorical recognition to the contrary, the 
existence of fundamental social divisions underpinning water insecurity, injustice, and inequali-
ty, which are major drivers of water conflict. Thus, a truly inter-disciplinary approach to the 
problem must strive to make observable those processes that create and reproduce the structural 
socio-economic and political inequalities that continue to preclude a large sector of the world’s 
population not only from participating in the governance of water, but even from accessing es-
sential volumes of safe water for daily survival. This kind of approach requires addressing “wa-
ter conflicts” as an object of knowledge on its own right, which constitutes a crucial step to-
wards transforming the unacceptable conditions characterizing the “water crisis”. Our work 
seeks to make a contribution towards this daunting venture by calling for efforts to develop 
higher levels of coordination between the different cognitive structures and epistemic cultures 
involved in the production of knowledge about water.  
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ACRONYMS 
 
ADB     Asian Development Bank 
  
CBI     Council for Biotech Information 
 
DNA     Deoxyribonucleic acid 
 
EC     European Commission 
 
EUWATER  European Network for a New Water Culture  
 
FAO     Food and Agriculture Organization 
 
GWP    Global Water Partnership 
 
MCMA    Mexico City Metropolitan Area  
 
MDGs    Millennium Development Goals 
 
MSSRF    M.S. Swaminathan Research Foundation  
 
OECD-WPB Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – Working Party on Bio-
technology 
 
SARH    Secretariat of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (Mexico) 
 
SEMARNAT  Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (Mexico) 
 
UNCED   United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (The Earth Summit 1992) 
 
UNDP    United Nations Development Programme 
 
UNEP    United Nations Environment Programme 
 
UNESCO   United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
 
UNICEF   United Nations Children's Fund 
 
USAID    United States Agency for International Development 
 
WCW    World Commission on Water for the 21st Century  
 
WHO    World Health Organization 
 
WWF    World Water Forum 
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